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Punitiveness and the Emotions of Punishment: Between 
Solidarity and Hostility 
 
Anastasia Chamberlen and Henrique Carvalho1 
 
This chapter discusses how and why emotions are at the centre of the social and normative 
role of punishment. It looks at how emotions are articulated in the context of punishment, and 
examines how punitive emotions are manifest in the practice and representation of criminal justice 
in media and popular culture in western liberal democracies. By considering the relationship 
between emotions and punishment, this chapter also suggests that those same emotions that drive 
much of criminal justice practice are now also exercised and expressed outside and beyond criminal 
justice institutions, making punishment not just a concentrated institutional expression of the state’s 
response to crime, but a broader social phenomenon. We argue that understanding the emotional 
dimension of punishment requires us to understand it as a social phenomenon with significant span 
and impact on a range of communities and relations. We additionally suggest that the emotions of 
punishment have much to say not only about how we feel about one another, but also about how 
we feel about ourselves. 
To conduct this exploration into the relationship between punishment and emotions, we 
focus on a critical analysis of the concept of punitiveness. Punitiveness is a widely mobilised 
concept in criminology (e.g. Cheliotis 2013; Pratt et al 2005; Skinns 2016; Adriaenssen and Aertsen 
2015), but arguably it remains under-theorised, and its links to emotions, while partly 
acknowledged, have not been fully explicated (Andriaenssen and Aertsen 2015). Using 
sociological, social psychological, cultural criminological and socio-legal research, this chapter 
seeks to understand the ‘urge’ to punish (Garland 2001) in contemporary, Anglo-phone societies. 
The urge to punish is our tendency to increasingly pursue punishment and to assume it to be useful, 
unavoidable or necessary. We unpack this urge by arguing that punishment is inherently affective 
and often acts as more than just a response to crime, as a broader coping or defensive strategy. It 
reflects some of our innermost desires and fears, and seeks to manage a range of anxieties, 
insecurities and uncertainties by providing an illusory yet temporarily satisfying sense of 
reassurance in an otherwise uncertain and ambivalent social world. Punishment does this by 
enacting a (perverse and deeply problematic) sense of social solidarity (Durkheim 2014) through 
hostility (Carvalho and Chamberlen 2017; Chamberlen and Carvalho 2018). Through this 
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argument, we warn against a rationalist criminology that takes the affective dimension of 
punishment for granted, and highlight the need for a rigorous study of how the emotions, 
subjectivities and self-identities of offenders, victims, judges, juries, media and general members 
of the public contribute to the existence and maintenance of our framework of punishment in 
contemporary liberal societies. 
 The chapter begins by investigating some of the problems and limitations with the 
rationalism surrounding the predominant scholarship on punishment, then examines the place of 
punitiveness within the recent flourishing of an emotionally aware criminology scholarship. The 
third section of the chapter provides a conceptual framework based on the relation between 
solidarity and hostility within the role of punishment in society. The last section then draws on the 
implications of this framework, which suggest the need to investigate punishment as a broader 
social phenomenon beyond the confines of criminal justice, affecting politics as well as other areas 
of social life. 
 
The problem with rationalist understandings of punishment 
Traditionally, emotions have been strangely missing from many of the main studies of 
punishment. Beyond the work of a few sociologically oriented scholars in the area (e.g. Durkheim 
2014; Braithwaite 1989; Douglas 1993; Garland 2001; De Haan and Loader 2002; Karstedt 2002, 
2006; Karstedt, Loader, and Strang 2011), emotions were usually neglected or seen as secondary 
to criminological understandings of punishment (e.g. Bagaric 2001; Dolinko 1997; Matsueda et al 
2006). Much of the predominantly emotionless discussion in the field tended to view the definition 
and justifications for punishment as largely reliant on and derived from legal norms and 
philosophical rationales, and so assumed these to be based on predominantly ‘rational’ and 
pragmatic reasonings that sought to adequately respond to crime. This way of thinking about 
punishment as a rational response to violations of the criminal law stems from a legal and 
philosophical-normative approach that dates back to its intellectual origins in Enlightenment 
thinking (on this, see Norrie 1991, 2014). As a result, much of the philosophical and socio-legal 
literature on punishment and criminal justice has followed a similar rationalist logic, some of which 
seems to have deliberately avoided consideration of the emotional dimension of punishment, so as 
to avoid ascribing any assumption of irrationality to the institutionalised penal practices of modern 
societies. 
Similarly, criminology until recently has cast itself as a positivist discipline aspiring to 
appeal to ‘objectivist’ projects that prioritised rational choice models and structuralist accounts and 
critiques of justice and crime. This is primarily the result of criminology’s close focus and 
observation of the law and the criminal justice system, which have sought to perform a similar kind 
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of rationalist agenda (for a discussion on this see Carvalho and Chamberlen 2016; Karstedt 2011). 
This rationalist, sterile criminology has more recently been challenged (see Gadd and Jefferson 
2007; Jacobsen and Walklate 2016), but its legacy still impacts much of criminological thinking 
and research on criminal justice. This impact is evidenced by how an ‘emotion-free framework’ 
can also be identified in much of sociological criminology’s engagement with punishment, as it 
adopted a structuralist perspective in critiquing penal practices and institutions, locating 
punishment’s social function within broader structures of exclusion, regulation and socio-economic 
inequality (e.g. Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939; Melossi and Pavarini 1981; Wacquant 2009). Such 
analyses mostly neglect the emotionally-mediated dimension of punishment’s exclusionary and 
exploitative character, and overlook the extent to which its cultural-structural practices rely on 
expressive and repressive forces conditioned by feelings such as fear, anger or frustration. These 
sociological narratives have also consistently assumed that punishment has a rational and social-
functional basis. Even among its critics, punishment’s social function in controlling, disciplining 
and excluding particular social groups has been presented within a rationalist functionalism 
(Garland 1990) that ascribed to punishment an unavoidable link to notions of utility—that is, to the 
idea that punishment has a function in society, and that this function has to be understood, and 
criticised, on rational grounds. 
 Much like its ‘sister discipline’ of sociology, criminology can be criticised for being, rather 
surprisingly, insular and inward-looking in terms of its approaches, reach and span. Its 
concentration on application of, practice in, and solutions to criminal justice, though valuable, has 
also meant that, conceptually and theoretically, criminology occupied a relatively narrow field, 
drawing from some overtly rehearsed ‘grand narratives’ (Bosworth and Kauffman 2013), and 
neglecting other perspectives that are indispensable to a concrete understanding of crime, 
punishment, justice and social control. Arguably, a fuller and more nuanced exploration of the 
social role of punishment can only be pursued through a serious engagement with its emotional 
dimension, and this is only feasible if it includes a serious commitment to trans-disciplinarity. 
Given the complexity around unpacking the concept of emotions, this trans-disciplinarity should 
not shy away from studies of emotions and affect discussed in both the ‘hard’ sciences and the 
humanities, but in so doing, it should also strive to remain critical and reflexive in its 
conceptualisation and deployment of emotions. 
 However, such commitment arguably offers an additional challenge. A critical and trans-
disciplinary examination of punishment must move beyond the confines of the institutional penal 
practices of the criminal justice system, and recognise that punishment is a broader social 
phenomenon, whose discourse and logics are reproduced in other social contexts. In our societies, 
we (or some of us) continue to punish (and exclude) our children at home and at school; we punish, 
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police and discipline each other in intimate relations and in the workplace, and apply penalties and 
disciplinary measures in many areas of social life, ranging from more consequential practices like 
‘preventive’ healthcare provision, to less serious yet equally symbolic penalties, like those applied 
in plagiarism committees in colleges and universities. 
More recently, we have especially seen punitive discourses being used to enact and justify 
a range of public policies oriented towards the ‘governmentality of unease’ (Bigo 2002). We have 
seen this consistently applied in explicit performances (Jones et. al 2017) of hostility towards 
racialized ‘others’, and in mundane bordering practices in universities and public services. Most 
notably and emblematically, in the recent Anglophone context, punitive discourses have been 
deployed to shape populist political rhetoric, and appropriated punitive and exclusionary practices 
to create strategies of ‘management’ and bordering towards migrant populations, even when these 
are young children (Bosworth  2014; Aas and Bosworth 2013). Language and logics that evoke 
ideas of blame, responsibility and deterrence have also been invoked in austerity policies, and we 
have seen those reliant on welfare support or those in debt become subject to processes of control, 
retribution and discipline, while the lack of access to various services, housing and public spaces 
has been justified within a punitive logic exercised against those classified as the ‘undeserving 
poor’ (Kirwan et al 2016; Chunn and Gavigan 2004; Costelloe et al 2009; Kornhauser 2015; Hogan 
et al 2007). 
 These broader societal manifestations of punitive logics, which mirror, borrow from and 
reinforce the normative and symbolic framework of criminal justice, are indispensable to a 
comprehensive understanding of the social role of punishment, especially as they constitute 
emotional moments that are intrinsic to the constitution of this social role. In other words, we argue 
that to understand the emotions of punishment is to appreciate the problematically wider 
application of punitive sentiments and practices in our social lives. 
 
The role of emotions in recent criminological scholarship 
Although it is still fair to say that criminology remains significantly influenced by its 
positivist and rationalist origins, today, it is no longer entirely accurate to suggest that emotions are 
absent from scholarship on criminal justice and punishment. The past twenty or so years have seen 
a revival of interest on emotions, which was in many ways related to the broader ‘affective turn’ in 
the social sciences and the humanities that has become more prominent since the 2000s (Clough 
and Halley 2007; Hoggett and Thompson 2012). The impact of psychosocial approaches in 
criminology has been crucial in positioning emotions as key within a range of studies, including 
theorisations of punishment, histories of penality, and empirical research into the experience and 
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effects of imprisonment, among others (e.g. Gadd and Jefferson 2007; Pratt et al 2005; Liebling 
and Maruna 2005; Gelsthorpe 2007; van Marle and Maruna 2010; Chamberlen 2016, 2018). 
This scholarly turn to emotions was also driven by developments in criminal justice, 
especially by the increased presence of emotions in public debates on criminal justice practice 
observed in the past thirty years (Karstedt 2011). Since the late 1990s, rationalistic perspectives in 
law and criminal justice were abruptly side-lined, and as Lastaer and O’Malley (1996) argue, our 
contemporary criminal justice environment underwent a ‘re-emotionalisation’ process where 
blaming and the ascription of responsibility came to be expressed with clear emotive undertones. 
This re-emotionalisation tended to focus on negative emotions such as fear or more generally 
hostility towards the offender, but this was not always the case. For example, shame appeared as 
an important emotion for the pursuit of justice and, especially through restorative justice, since the 
mid-1990s we have seen a renewed focus on the experiences and perspectives of victims—meaning 
also a more concentrated focus on victims’ needs, and the introduction of often elaborate efforts to 
involve victims’ narratives in the justice process (Morgan and Zedner 1992; Walklate 2012; Rock 
1990, 2012). As Sandra Walklate has argued, the victim’s role in criminal proceedings has evolved 
into being ‘used more and more as a political and symbolic reference point’ (Walklate 2012:15). 
This more victim-centred approach has reflected various policy changes since 1997, many of which 
have been influenced by and intertwined with political rhetoric (e.g. see Hall 2013). 
However, while these developments in criminal justice did provide a context in which the 
role of emotions is more active, and more widely acknowledged, such role was predominantly 
problematic, even in its less negative connotations. For instance, although the re-emotionalisation 
of criminal justice did provide for a greater involvement of victims in the criminal justice process, 
this has acted less as a means of recognising victimhood and more as a justification for increased 
criminalisation and harsher penalties, essentially working in the service of punitiveness. 
 
A return to emotions via the rise of punitiveness  
It is now widely accepted that, since the late 1970s, criminal justice systems in the UK and 
USA have become increasingly more punitive, seeking to criminalise more, incarcerating for 
longer periods, and generally adopting a ‘tough’ political and sentencing agenda to crime control 
(Skinns 2016). Though the rise of punitiveness is the subject of widespread discussion in 
criminology, the empirical evidence around it has been opaquer (for a review of data on 
punitiveness, see Andriaessen and Aertsen 2015:94-95 on global research; Warner et. al 2017 for 
research on punitiveness with jurors in Australia; and Roberts and Hough 2012 for public attitudes 
to sentencing in England). While definitions of punitiveness can vary (Matthews 2005), broadly 
speaking, discussions about punitiveness in the sociology of punishment have mostly been 
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influenced by David Garland’s leading analysis of the penal realm in the twentieth and twenty-first 
century. In his discussion of recent penal changes in the UK and the US, Garland (2001:9) argues 
that in the latter part of the twentieth and at the start of the twenty-first century penal policy has 
returned to a “just deserts” approach where retribution reappeared as a renewed, dominant goal of 
the system, in contrast to the consequentialist, ‘welfarist’ approaches that were previously 
predominant. This re-legitimisation of retributive purposes has allowed for politicians to express 
‘punitive sentiments’ more openly and intensely, and for legislators to enact ‘more draconian laws’ 
(Garland 2001:9). 
This is not to say that the welfarist model that preceded this more punitive atmosphere was 
not emotionally-driven. As Garland (2001:10) clarifies, this previous moment just focused on a 
different set of emotions, and according to him had a ‘more progressive sense of justice’ that 
retained a sense of ‘decency’, humanity’ and ‘compassion’ for the needs of offenders. The move 
towards punitivism switched the emotional landscape of criminal justice towards more negative 
emotions, which were driven by a more generalised rhetoric and sense of anxiety. Garland 
summarises this affective, historical shift as follows:  
 
Since the 1970s fear of crime has come to have new salience. What was once regarded as a localised, 
situational anxiety, afflicting the worst-off individuals and neighbourhoods, has come to be regarded as 
a major social problem and a characteristic of contemporary culture (Garland 2001:10). 
 
According to this account, the context of crime has been ‘re-dramatised’ in the eyes of the public, 
and was used to influence ‘the style and content of policy making’ in recent decades. And, beyond 
the specifics of policy, scholars like Garland, Pratt (2002) and Simon (2007) have also argued that 
in late-modernity and under neoliberalism we have witnessed an increased tendency to seek more 
expressive and visual penalties, some of which are purposefully public and stigmatising (see also 
Valier 2002 on ‘gothic populism’). 
 Even the prison, which has been traditionally considered an impermeable, invisible space, 
removed from the public’s view, in recent years has been increasingly scrutinised by the media and 
the public, through news articles, documentaries, TV and cinematic portrayals and political 
debates. These representations of prison life not only have become a popular source of 
entertainment, but also are to a large extent a direct expression of the tendencies discussed above, 
as they feed into public sentiments, and both shape and express punitive attitudes (see Chamberlen 
and Carvalho 2018). 
Thus, policy as well as discourse on punishment are not only emotionally-driven, but more 
recently they have also contributed to shifting the public’s emotions towards a more punitive 
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approach (see e.g. Newburn and Jones 2005). This means that, while it would be simplistic to see 
the emotionality of punishment primarily as an irrational reaction to rhetoric and fearmongering, it 
must be recognised that, in more recent years, there has been a rise in what we call a form of hostile 
politics, which can be seen to be directly related to an emotional attachment to an illusory but 
largely hegemonic idea that punishment is useful and necessary. The following sections in this 
chapter engage with sociological, social psychological and political debates, paying particular 
attention to our contemporary feelings of insecurity and anxiety, to unpack the links between 
hostility and the emotionality of punishment.  
 
The emotions of punishment in criminal justice: lessons from sociology and social psychology  
In the beginning of this chapter, we suggested that a proper understanding of the 
emotionality of punishment requires a committed trans-disciplinary investigation of punishment as 
social phenomenon, practice and coping strategy. This section concentrates on exploring how the 
social role of punishment can be conceptualised as inherently emotional, and how this 
conceptualisation can explain the prevalence and the allure of punitive attitudes and discourses in 
contemporary liberal societies such as the UK and the USA. 
 Any exploration of the emotional dimension of the social role of punishment must 
inevitably engage with the work of Émile Durkheim. It was Durkheim (2013, 2014) who first 
suggested that the primary purpose of punishment was not to deter or control crime, but to provide 
for the ‘ritualised re-affirmation of collective values and the reinforcement of group solidarity’ 
(Garland 2013:23). In other words, the apparatus of punishment symbolically promotes the image 
of an ordered, cohesive society whose values and rules are shared by the whole of its political 
community. Crime is experienced by this community as a violation of its norms, and punishment, 
by symbolically reaffirming those norms, also maintains and reinforces the bonds of social 
solidarity, thus bringing the community together. The images and ideas around this conception of 
punishment—the re-affirmation of shared values, the notion of crime as a moral and social 
violation, the expression of solidarity with the victim and those affected by crime—are present in 
many contemporary normative understandings of punishment, and  are commonplace in recent 
criminal justice discourses. At the same time, the image of society put forward by the symbolism 
of punishment, of a strong community brought together by common values that are only truly 
disturbed by crime, is nothing if not problematic. Instead, many sociologists conceptualise the last 
30 or so years as a period largely characterised by processes of social fragmentation rather than 
cohesion (see Giddens 1991; Bauman 1991; Rose 2001), something which has only been 
exacerbated by the recent economic crisis since 2008. What is more puzzling is that this is precisely 
the period where a rise in punitive attitudes has been identified, so that there is now significant 
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indication that there might be an inverse correlation between the urge to punish and levels of 
solidarity in contemporary social settings (Greenberg 1999; Pratt 2007).  
 This does not mean that the link between punishment and solidarity proposed by Durkheim 
should be completely abandoned; it does, however, mean that it must be reconceptualised from a 
critical perspective. We have argued elsewhere (Carvalho and Chamberlen 2017; Chamberlen and 
Carvalho 2018) that the contemporary surge of punishment and punitive feelings in specific social 
settings can be related precisely to the lack of a concrete and comprehensive sense of social 
solidarity in these settings. This idea finds resonance in research that has suggested that levels of 
punishment tend to be high in contexts where there are high levels of inequality, or lack of welfare 
provision (Downes and Hansen 2006; Lacey 2007; Pickett and Wilkinson 2010), and that processes 
of criminalisation are more widespread and authoritarian in periods of heightened social insecurity 
and anxiety (Ericson 2007; Sparks 2012), which themselves have been linked to the erosion of 
more solidary forms and structures of citizenship (Ramsay 2006; Reiner 2010; Carvalho 2017). 
These diverse links can illustrate that, as Durkheim suggested, there is an intimate relation between 
the symbolic function of punishment and social solidarity; however, contrary to what Durkheim 
predicted, in contemporary societies the urge to punish may be at its strongest when the bonds of 
social solidarity are precarious. 
 In these circumstances, punishment performs an important symbolic and emotive role, as 
part of an apparatus geared at managing feelings of insecurity and anxiety, and social alienation 
more broadly. It does so by channeling such turmoil towards crime and criminals. This 
‘governmentality of unease’ (Bigo 2002) relies on an artificial sense of solidarity, which effectively 
promotes a sense of identification through estrangement (Bauman 2000; Sparks 2001) by 
advancing an image of community in which individuals are bonded together by means of their 
vulnerability against crime and their antagonism towards offenders. This sense of solidarity on 
which punishment relies can be deemed artificial because it does not build upon or even actively 
relate to what can be considered the conditions for concrete solidarity, such as welfare, 
communication and recognition. 
Furthermore, since the sense of solidarity promoted by punishment needs to be constructed, 
the image of social order which it produces is necessarily simplified: individuals are brought 
together as members of an essentially good, lawful social order, and pitted against criminals, which 
are also presented primarily as dangerous others. This essentialised worldview is reproduced 
through the rituals of criminalisation (Carvalho and Chamberlen 2017) performed in political, 
public and media discourses, which precede and follow punishment. This social imaginary (Taylor 
2004) put forward by punishment is inevitably abstract, since it is removed from most people’s 
social experiences; however, symbolically this abstraction from concrete experience is precisely 
9 
 
what gives punishment its strong appeal in circumstances of social fragmentation. The emotionality 
of punishment speaks directly to the ‘anxious subject’ (Isin 2014), serving as a social psychological 
defence mechanism (Brown 2003) which these subjects can use to cope with deeper, generalised 
feelings of insecurity and anxiety by channeling these feelings towards specific threats and fears 
(Marsh 1996; King and Maruna 2009; Carvalho and Chamberlen 2016). While such feelings are 
channeled, and thus managed, by the symbolism of punishment, since punishment does very little 
about the lack of concrete solidarity underpinning such feelings, it offers no way out of the 
persecutory phantasy (Reeves 2018) which it builds around them. 
This coping mechanism embedded within the symbolic logic of punishment is particularly 
enthralling because, as Janet Ainsworth (2009) has observed, this logic is intimately related to 
cognitive biases that individuals commonly maintain to deal with the many anxieties and perceived 
sources of danger that affect their sense of safety and wellbeing. Most importantly, punitive 
attitudes are linked to an ‘illusion of control’, through which individuals manage their anxiety by 
focusing on specific identified threats (such as crime) which they believe can (or must) be 
controlled, therefore engaging in ‘continued irrational and ineffective behaviour even in the face 
of negative feedback’ (Ainsworth 2009:265). Furthermore, beyond giving individuals a sense of 
control, punishment also reinforces an illusion of order, providing a ‘sense of orderliness’ which 
permits individuals ‘to experience an idealized world with just resolutions’ (King and Maruna, 
2006:23), which often contrasts with a much less neat and coherent social reality. This sense of 
orderliness is potentially the most appealing trait of the symbolic framework of punishment, 
particularly since it is tied to a host of penal practices which, to this day, remain inextricably linked 
to pain and violence (Sykes 1958; Christie 1981; Liebling and Maruna 2005; Liebling, 2011; 
Chamberlen 2016, 2018). Thus, the emotionality of punishment allows anxious subjects to repress 
their feelings of insecurity and anxiety, by giving or reinforcing illusions of control and order, at 
the same time as it provides them with a channel through which to express their frustration by 
projecting hostile feelings toward criminalised others. For that reason, we have argued (Carvalho 
and Chamberlen 2017) that the form of solidarity embedded within punishment is characterised by 
its hostility, since it is linked to what George Herbert Mead (1918:591) called ‘the emotional 
solidarity of aggression’. 
 
The emotions of punishment beyond criminal justice: the psychology of justice and the 
politics of hostility 
For us, acknowledging the hostility within the emotionality of punishment has interrelated 
implications. First, an important consequence of the dynamics between the symbolism within 
punishment and its emotional appeal is that the emotionality of punishment is inherently political. 
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To have expressive value, punishment relies on a set of moral images and ideologies that not only 
drive penal policy, but also more generally shape and influence our politics. For instance, going 
back to the earlier discussion on the punitive turn, right-wing authoritarianism and conservativism 
have been held to be a common predictor for punitive attitudes (Palasinski and Shortland 2017; 
Adriaenssen and Aertsen 2015). Likewise, research into recent political developments has indicated 
that punitive attitudes have been closely related to feelings of disgruntlement toward mainstream 
politics, expressed by those who feel that their status and values have been neglected and who long 
to rescue an image of community which they believe is currently under threat. For instance, after 
the EU Referendum in the United Kingdom, the British Election Study’s internet panel survey of 
2015–16 found significant links between voters’ age, religion, race and ethnicity, their level of 
support for Brexit, and endorsement of capital punishment and other harsh penalties (Kaufmann 
2016). Such links between support for Brexit and support for capital and corporal punishment were 
again suggested in a more recent survey (British Social Attitudes Survey 2017). The idea that 
punishment constitutes ‘a way to act decisively in a time of relative uncertainty’ (van Marie and 
Maruna 2010:8-9) gives it significant ideological allure. 
Now, it is important to highlight how, somewhat paradoxically, whilst invoking and relying 
on fear, anger and frustration, the pursuit of punitiveness is sought in an effort to alleviate these 
same emotions and thus, when harsh punishment is seen to be exercised, it can also end up giving 
those feeling punitive a brief sense of satisfaction, reassurance and comfort. This complex interplay 
between hostility and satisfaction suggests that feelings for punishment play at our self-perceptions 
and, though focused on punishing others, they seek to make us feel better about ourselves. It is thus 
perhaps unsurprising that scholars have also identified a link between the emotional features of 
punishment and the proliferation of economic uncertainty. Costelloe et al (2009:28) have found 
that ‘those men [note not women] who expected their economic situation to become worse, were 
significantly more punitive than those who expected to be doing better’, and this is particularly the 
case for white men. Such research points to the links between the rise in punitiveness and the rise 
of economic individualism under neoliberalism. The governmental prioritisation of self-steering 
neoliberal subjects has arguably created a perfect ‘other’ towards whom punitive logics and policies 
are often directed, the ‘undeserving poor’ who fail to engage with the fast-paced, competitive 
nature of neoliberalism (Kornhausser 2015). Interestingly, those affected by austerity measures 
often also become the target audience for hostile political rhetoric. 
Meanwhile, psychologists and criminologists have also found that there is a link between 
racial prejudices and preference for harsher penalties (Johnson 2009; Unnever and Cullen 2007). 
More generally, the mostly US-based research that identifies links between attitudes to punishment 
and race also suggests that punitive feelings are strongest towards those we identify as different to 
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us. For instance, white juries tend to show more solidarity with white victims and defendants and 
more hostility towards BME defendants (Garland 2013; Lynch and Haney 2014). These links 
illustrate possibly the most problematic aspect of the hostile solidarity of punishment: its punitive 
logic produces a sense of solidarity and satisfaction only through hostility, and this means that it 
occurs only insofar as it also produces and reinforces structural violence and processes of 
marginalisation and exclusion. In so doing, it contributes to conditions that are likely to perpetuate 
cycles of hostility, for three reasons. First, it allows and encourages explicit performances of 
aggression towards those identified as other, the ‘abject’ (Kristeva 1982) who falls outside the 
‘community of value’ (Anderson 2013). Second, it requires the maintenance of hostility to preserve 
the sense of solidarity that it engenders. And, third, in derogating and dehumanising the other in 
order to legitimise and facilitate punitive attitudes towards them, it generates in the other the same 
feelings of insecurity and alienation that encourage hostility in the first place (see Kteily and 
Bruneau 2017), thus turning the process of criminalisation into a self-fulfilling prophecy (see 
Phillips 2017). 
The second implication is that while the emotionality of punishment is constructed, 
expressed and repressed in particular contexts, this does not necessarily mean that such feelings 
remain constrained only within these contexts. The reason for this is that emotions are 
intersubjective and they travel via our interactions, lived experiences, exchanges and relations 
(Chamberlen 2018). Thus, our punitive feelings or our feelings towards justice can be transferred 
and reproduced elsewhere, meaning that scenarios and dynamics traditionally thought of as 
criminal justice specific may now be spilling onto other practices, casting binaries of 
dangerous/law-abiding or trustworthy/risky citizens towards groups who have not been previously 
subjected to them. More broadly, expressions of hostile solidarity now abound in many institutional 
settings, such as migration and borders (Aas and Bosworth 2013; Bosworth 2017; Kaufman 2015), 
education (Lyons and Drew 2009), and even health and wellbeing (Kirkland 2014). This reflects a 
dispersal of penal power, where the spectacle of justice and punishment is no longer exclusively in 
the remit of criminal justice systems (Cohen 1979; Wacquant 2009). 
Third, the psychosocial dynamics involved in the emotionality of punishment mean that 
these emotions are complex and enduring, but are also pliable and potentially changeable. 
Arguably, this raises attention to the complexity and problematic nature of those sentiments driving 
punishment today. This, however, does not necessarily mean that negative emotions such as 
vengeance or fear have to be the central or only feelings we express in the realm of justice. Indeed, 
we think that to acknowledge the emotionality of punishment serves as both a problem as well as 
a kind of hope for a solution. All the institutions of criminal justice are ‘simultaneously objects and 
representations of collective emotions’ (Karstedt 2011:7), and therefore it should be feasible to re-
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imagine justice in more ‘emotionally intelligent’ (Sherman 2003) practices that rely more on 
‘positive’ emotions such as forgiveness and reparation. Doing so would require a 
reconceptualization of the framework surrounding punishment and criminal justice, which would 
ultimately reimagine these institutions, moving their focus away from hostility and punitiveness, 
and towards emotional transformation. This chapter has suggested that in order to do this, 
punishment and criminal justice practice and scholarship need to move beyond problematic 
dualisms, and especially ought to problematize and overcome the Cartesian dichotomy between 
rational and emotional approaches to justice. As Susan Karstedt (2011) has suggested, the creative 
making of processes through which criminal justice transforms the emotions and lived experiences 




The question of why we punish is arguably a fundamental question to the study of the 
relation between punishment and emotions, as there are strong reasons to believe that the urge to 
punish is intrinsically related to the role of punishment in society. This field of enquiry can both 
provide interesting insights in developments and debates on retributive and distributive justice, and 
highlight the difficulties in pursuing a fulfilling sense of justice through punishment. This chapter 
has shown that emotions are an essential and defining feature of punishment and require more 
dedicated scholarly attention. Paying closer attention to the affective aspects of punishment can 
have several implications for future practice and scholarship in this area, as recognition of the 
emotional conditioning of punishment raises important theoretical, empirical and methodological 
issues. First, an emotionally-aware account of punishment raises questions about who we are as 
punishers. To achieve this, we need a renewed, affective theory of criminal justice, which is 
necessarily engaged with notions of modern identity and subjectivity and situates the emotions of 
punishment beyond our feelings about crime, but traces our emotional urge to punish to how we 
feel about and perceive our own individual and social identities. Attention to the psychosocial 
aspects of modern identities can potentially position punishment in processes of late-modern 
ambivalent relations and a general sense of uncertainty. 
The emotional features of punishment also raise questions about whether it should be 
considered a pathological phenomenon. If we are to acknowledge the affective and deeply 
problematic elements of punishment, we then also ought to ask whether there is a therapeutic 
approach to punishment. Moreover, a positive emotional transformation in criminal justice requires 
a more sustained critique of punishment as a concept and phenomenon; it thus requires a more 
activist account of how the defining features of punishment are not only ineffective for those who 
13 
 
experience it, but are also detrimental to all of us as communities. An emotional redirection, in 
other words, may mean that scholars of punishment ought to engage and commit more with the 
possibilities of abolitionism, decarceration and transformative justice. To show that punishment is 
emotionally motivated is an exercise of critique, and researchers of punishment should more 
actively reflect on the role of scholarship in not only observing and analysing such phenomena, but 
also in opposing the expansion of the penal state and the exacerbation of negative emotions in the 
criminal justice field. 
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